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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
No. 18-2565 
___________ 
 
WADE KNIGHT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CASE MANAGER JONATHAN KAMINSKI; WARDEN TROY WILLIAMSON; 
GEORGE C. NYE, III; MARK G. GULA; LOUIS CAPRIO; DAVID ANDINO;  
STEVEN J. VALENCIK; MICHAEL A. QUIJADA; MICHAEL ORN; AMILENE 
WERTMAN 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 3:05-cv-00018) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 31, 2019 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed February 6, 2019) 
___________ 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant Wade Knight appeals from the District Court’s denial of his 
motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).  For the reasons that follow, 
we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
In 2005, Knight filed a complaint in the District Court, raising, as relevant here, 
claims against correctional staff under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).  The 
District Court ultimately granted defendants summary judgment on Knight’s FTCA 
claims, relying on Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986).  We affirmed the 
District Court’s judgment on the same grounds.  See Knight v. Kaminski, 331 F. App’x 
901 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (non-precedential).  The Supreme Court denied Knight’s 
subsequent petition for a writ of certiorari. 
 In 2013, the Supreme Court overruled Pooler in Millbrook v. United States, 569 
U.S. 50 (2013).  Soon after, Knight filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in the District Court, 
relying on Millbrook to argue that the District Court erred in granting defendants 
summary judgment.  The District Court denied Knight’s motion, concluding that the 
decision in Millbrook did not apply to cases like Knight’s that had already been closed.  
After Knight appealed, we concluded that the District Court had not utilized “a flexible, 
multifactor approach” in resolving Knight’s motion.  See Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 122 
(3d Cir. 2014).  We remanded the matter back to the District Court to consider, in the first 
instance, whether Knight had made a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” which 
would entitle him to relief.  See id. 
 On remand, the District Court denied Knight’s motion.  It determined that Knight 
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relied solely on the existence of Millbrook as the basis for his motion and that he had not 
“come forward with any factors or other considerations to warrant [Rule 60(b)(6) relief] 
except that he was adversely affected by a post-judgment change in the law.”  See Dist. 
Ct. Dkt. No. 193 at ECF p. 3.  The District Court noted various defenses that defendants 
had presented regarding Knight’s FTCA claims, which Knight had not addressed in his 
Rule 60(b)(6) motion or in any later briefing.  Knight timely appealed. 
We review the District Court’s denial of Knight’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for abuse 
of discretion.  See Brown v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003).  “An 
abuse of discretion may be found when the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to 
fact.”  Reform Party of Allegheny Cty. v. Allegheny Cty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 
305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We may 
summarily affirm a district court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the 
appeal fails to present a substantial question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 
(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Knight’s motion.  “[C]ourts are to dispense their broad powers under 60(b)(6) 
only in extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and 
unexpected hardship would occur.”  Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “[W]e have not embraced any categorical rule that a change in decisional law 
is never an adequate basis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.”  Id. at 121.  Rather, “we have long 
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employed a flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions, including those built 
upon a post-judgment change in the law, that takes into account all the particulars of a 
movant’s case.”  Id. at 122. 
 The only argument Knight has made in support of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion both 
initially and after remand is that Millbrook changed the law that applied to his FTCA 
claims.  He has not identified any other factors in support of his motion, as the District 
Court observed.  Knight has not clarified his argument on appeal, and he has had several 
opportunities to show how extraordinary circumstances apply to his case.  Accordingly, 
we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.1 
                                              
1  In light of our disposition, Knight’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.  See 
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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